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Unlike its trade-counterpart, the relationship between international investment law and 
labor standards has neither resulted in much treaty practice nor attracted extensive 
scholarly attention. The 2004 US Model bilateral investment treaty (BIT) was among the 
first to devote a full article to labor standards (Article 13). The revised US Model BIT,1 
published in May 2012, updates and expands this provision. 
 
The 2012 Model provides that each party “shall ensure” it does not derogate from, offer 
to derogate from, or fail effectively to enforce its labor laws to encourage investment 
(Article 13(2)). The effective enforcement requirement is new compared to the 2004 
Model, reflecting that the weakening of labor standards often occurs due to lack of 
enforcement rather than formal derogations. These obligations align with firmer 
commitments in recent US free trade agreements (FTAs) and depart from the aspirational 
language of the 2004 Model and the BITs of other states, which merely require that 
parties “should not” derogate from existing labor legislation or “shall strive to ensure” not 
to do so.2 The obligations in question are not limited to investments from the other party, 
but equally apply to the weakening of labor standards in favor of investments of third 
states (Article 2(1)(c)). 
 
The 2012 Model adds (the right to) non-discrimination in respect of employment and 
occupation to the list of non-derogable labor rights. Compared to the 2004 Model, the list 
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now comprises all four “core labor rights” listed as such in the ILO’s 1998 Declaration, 
as well the right to acceptable conditions of work, which is otherwise not found in the 
Declaration. In other respects, the 2012 Model is less demanding than similar clauses 
found in other states’ BITs, as it effectively prohibits only derogations from domestic 
labor laws where such derogations are “inconsistent” with non-derogable rights, and not 
derogations in general. Derogations relating to social security arrangements, easing of 
termination of employment standards or reduction of labor inspections, for example, 
would thus not be actionable. Furthermore, a party that currently observes labor standards 
below the minimum of what is required by the ILO has no express obligation to bring its 
legislation in conformity with those norms. 
 
As with the 2004 Model, the labor clause of the 2012 Model remains outside the treaty’s 
dispute settlement provisions. This differs from BITs of other states, which provide for 
that possibility. It also differs from recent US FTAs, which allow for state-state 
arbitration of disputes concerning labor provisions. Instead, the labor clause provides a 
consultations procedure (Article 13(4)) that has become more detailed and extensive than 
that applicable under the 2004 Model. But state-state arbitrations seldom occur under 
BITs. Investors, on the other hand, can often pursue claims relating to the (non-) 
enforcement of labor obligations by relying upon other standards of treatment guaranteed 
by a BIT, for which arbitration remains available.3 
 
At a time when concerns are being voiced about BITs unduly restraining states’ 
regulatory autonomy, it is surprising that the 2012 Model does not expressly recognize 
the right of each party to establish its own level of domestic labor standards. This differs 
from the labor provisions under US FTAs, and even from the 2012 Model’s provision on 
environment, which expressly recognizes regulatory discretion in environmental matters 
(Article 12(3)). Arguably, the parties’ policy space in relation to the improvement of 
labor standards is nonetheless safeguarded through the preambular paragraph expressing 
the desire to achieve the treaty objectives “in a manner consistent with … the promotion 
of internationally recognized labor rights,” as well as by the new provision affirming the 
parties’ respective obligations as ILO members and their commitments under the ILO 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (Article 13(1)). 
 
Regrettably, the 2012 Model does not follow the trend of recent investment treaties that 
feature provisions providing that contracting parties “should encourage” foreign investors 
to adhere voluntarily to internationally recognized standards of corporate social 
responsibility, such as those found in the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises.4 
 
The amendments to the 2012 Model represent a small but welcome step in bridging the 
divide between investment law and public policy concerns. The scope of applicable labor 
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standards and the level of commitment are more demanding than in its predecessor and 
most other (model) BITs. But it lacks a clear obligation to adopt and maintain ILO 
standards as a minimum, and does not allow disputes to be submitted to arbitration. We 
see no legal argument that explains why there should be a difference between BITs and 
FTAs on this issue. 
 
The inclusion of labor provisions in model BITs is on the rise. We hope that this trend 
will receive more attention from scholars and practitioners, to further the interpretation 
and development of such provisions. 
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